As observers continue swinging between various interpretations of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood may be one step closer to institutionalizing its hold on power. Egypt’s Supreme Judicial Council — the highest administrative judicial body — agreed Monday to oversee a national referendum, slated for Dec. 15, on a new charter for the nation. The decision, which revealed the deep divisions within the judiciary as well as the apparently substantial number of Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers in the court system, came a day after the Supreme Constitutional Court went on strike indefinitely.
The 19 judges who make up the Supreme Constitutional Court — the majority of whom were appointed by former President Hosni Mubarak — were expected to vote against the legality of the Brotherhood-dominated assembly in charge of drafting the constitution on Sunday. The judges claimed that the pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters that crowded the building prevented them from holding the vote and that they would suspend work until they could function “without being subject to moral or physical pressure.” The explanation for the strike was not all that convincing, though. A closer look at the security detail surrounding the building and at the size of the crowd suggests that the Supreme Constitutional Court was looking for an excuse to avoid the vote and perhaps give time to work out a deal with Morsi.
Our focus thus returns to the principal character of this saga: the president. From one angle, Morsi appears to be a calculating politician intent on consolidating his hold on power for Egyptian Islamists. From another angle, Morsi appears to be an overzealous political neophyte who overstepped his bounds, who can’t turn back and who is now improvising in hopes that the divisions and errors of his opponents will allow him to succeed. It would be fair to say that most Egyptians, as well as outside observers, are unsure which is the real Morsi.
Remember that Morsi was not the Muslim Brotherhood’s first choice for president. He became the group’s candidate only after Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Supreme Guide Kheirat el Shater was disqualified by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. The generals may have assumed that Morsi was more pliable to their interests, but his actions over the past several days suggest anything but.
This would not be the first time in Egypt’s recent history that the public misread its leader. When Gamal Abdel Nasser was assassinated in 1970, his successor, Anwar Sadat, was viewed as a puppet of Nasser and was derogatively referred to as a “donkey” of the old guard regime. That perception was quickly dashed. Only six months into his presidency, when he was satisfied that any pillars of resistance could be thwarted, Sadat unleashed his independent streak. He purged his government of Soviet-leaning Nasserite loyalists of the Free Officer movement and replaced them with his own followers. He disbanded Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union, replacing it with the National Democratic Party and liberalizing the economy to give rise to a new civilian elite. Sadat then used street protests in support of his policies to hold his ground.
Sadat expelled some 20,000 Soviet military trainers from Egypt and put the country on a path toward war with Israel. He didn’t do this because he was confident that his forces could impose defeat on Israel; he was searching for a Clausewitzian political solution to Egypt’s interminable security dilemma with its eastern neighbor. In the end, Sadat secured a Sinai buffer and a peace treaty with Israel and a strategic patron in the United States. Sadat was initially taken for a fool and surprised the world with a strategic shift that would shape the eastern Mediterranean for decades. Will Morsi or any other Islamist figure arise from the present conditions to do the same? Only time will tell.